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Biden and Human Rights: Falling Short of International Consensus

11 January 2024

Gauging Biden's alignment with global human rights norms. A commentary by Brian Dooley (GGI Visiting Scholar) and Tom Pegram (GGI Director).

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It鈥檚 three years this week since Joe Biden became president. In the last months of the Donald Trump administration, we previewed what a Biden White House might mean for U.S. commitment to the international human rights community.

We feared that while Biden would be an improvement on Trump, a deep-rooted, unhelpful sense of American self-regard would remain. 鈥淲ashington will need to wean itself off the intoxicating idea of its exceptional status in world affairs鈥, we said.

It hasn鈥檛.聽 This brief essay is not a judgment on how well or poorly Biden鈥檚 administration has fulfilled to put human rights 鈥渁t the heart鈥 of its foreign policy, but an assessment of whether it has moved any closer to the centre of an international consensus on human rights norms.

While Biden reversed Trump鈥檚 abandonment of the UN Human Rights Council, and ditched the absurd , the US seem no nearer to fully joining the world鈥檚 mainstream human rights policies, including , , , and it continues to .

Although the US has ratified the , last month a UN committee issued a highly critical on its lack of compliance with the treaty.

Unlike , the US still (NHRI),聽 and the Biden administration even appears to be willing to in order to pass unrelated aid legislation.

This month, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken鈥檚 聽of the International Court of Justice brought by South Africa against Israel as 鈥渁 distraction鈥 not only disagreed with the case brought, but appeared fundamentally disrespectful toward the process.

Such actions have undercut the credibility of the Biden administration鈥檚 commitment to the so-called 鈥渞ules-based international order鈥, as a bulwark against 鈥渢he most serious long-term challenge to the international order鈥, namely China.聽 In laying out this agenda, Blinken was keen to emphasise 鈥淸t]hat there鈥檚 another area of alignment we share with our allies and partners: human rights鈥.聽 Recent events have done little to reassure US allies and partners that this is the case.

There is a peculiar paradox at the heart of this American aversion to egalitarian global governance structures. America wants to go it alone, but at the same time also wants to be in charge. And this self-importance isn鈥檛 just an instinct of American conservatives.

When he was running for president, Biden that his foreign policy would put 鈥渢he United States back at the head of the table鈥. Herein lies the problem, when American liberals believe that the world wants Washington at the head of its table. Too often US officials boast that America should be captaining a global team when in reality it barely makes the substitutes鈥 bench.

In 1988, when Madeleine Albright was US Secretary of State in the Clinton administration, that 鈥淲e stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future鈥, and some American liberals still appear convinced that what the rest of the (myopic) world most craves is American leadership.

American liberal foreign policy thinking hasn鈥檛 evolved much since. In a , Antony Blinken emphasised America鈥檚 鈥渓eadership around the world鈥, adding magnanimously that 鈥淚n this pivotal time, America鈥檚 global leadership is not a burden鈥.聽 It would appear that US foreign policy elite have taken to heart the title of prominent liberal academic G. John Ikenberry鈥檚 book, , but missed the message on pursuing an 鈥渆nlightened strategy鈥 when it comes to renegotiating US relations with the rest of the world.

The following month Biden 鈥淎merican leadership is what holds the world together鈥 and that the US must remain 鈥渁 beacon to the world鈥.

Biden continues , as have insisted, that the US is 鈥渢he one indispensable nation鈥. It鈥檚 hard to know exactly what that means, but the clear implication is that all other nations 鈥 adversaries and allies alike 鈥 are ultimately dispensable to the interests of American foreign policy. What does this mean for Afghanistan? Or Ukraine or Taiwan?

Washington is regarded as an increasingly unreliable international partner 鈥 apart from its failure over many decades to join the mainstream consensus on human rights, international pledges made by one US presidency are now likely to reversed by the next.

When Deputy US Ambassador to the UN Robert Wood raised his hand on December 8, he not only exercised America鈥檚 lone veto on a in Gaza, which was backed by over 90 countries. He also messaged a US intention to remain an international outlier on rights, further signalled the US as an unreliable ally to the mainstream human rights movement, and waved goodbye to the White House鈥檚 claim to .

Another Trump administration will no doubt be a disaster for the international rights landscape. But if Biden wins, American liberalism needs to give itself a reality check, ditch the dated, inflated rhetoric, reassess Washington鈥檚 place in the world, and focus on joining the mainstream human rights movement rather than boasting that it leads it.